Partijos laikraštis


The Puzzle Of Wto Safeguards And Regional Trade Agreements

In other words, if the Dominican Republic had really wanted to evade WTO jurisdiction, it would have two alternative policy options that would allow it to do so. Admittedly, these two alternative options do not end in a political result exactly the same as that which was actually implemented, but they are quite close to achieving the same goal. Assuming that the actual political outcome is considered optimal, the first alternative (i.e. the general increase in tariffs applied under the MFN) suffers from excessive integration, since the range of countries affected by the higher tariff rate is extended to the four developing countries excluded from WTO protection (i.e. Colombia Indonesia, Mexico and Panama). On the other hand, the second solution is that the number of countries concerned does not cover countries other than China that are not contracting parties to CAFTA-DR (for example. B Thailand). However, given that imports from all these countries represent such a small percentage (see Chart 3), the cost of these differences in political outcomes and the resulting trade deterrence effects are not significant. Our point is that a country that wants to evade a PTA obligation can, by its choice of viable political alternatives, divert the dispute from WTO dispute settlement, instead of offering a choice of forum to its ASP partner.

What are the options of a country facing a situation similar to that of the Dominican Republic? One option is to introduce protection through another temporary policy instrument of trade barriers, such as anti-dumping or countervailing duties. But this alternative can also be compartmentalized, depending on the facts. The establishment of an anti-dumping duty assumes that the domestic industry provides evidence that the product is imported below its „normal value“, which cannot always be proven, especially if the importation comes from a PTA partner considered to have the right to market economy. The imposition of a countervailing duty assumes that the foreign producer is subsidized by his government under certain unfair conditions; This too is difficult to prove, given that many foreign producers, as in this case, do not receive subsidies.

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